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Abstract 
Credit enhancement is absolutely essential for financing Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects in Asia particularly for 
countries whose sovereign credit rating is on non-investment grade and foreign investment is difficult to achieve. In IPP project, 
due to lots of agreements among varies parties, it is hard to clearly visualize the roles of these agreements. Examples are: What 
credit enhancement factors are most influential to minimize the associated risks of IPP projects? Why are they powerful? What 
are their roles? Who are less powerful and what are the obstacles that cause them less powerful? A research is conducted to 
identify the credit enhancement factors for IPP projects in Asia. IPP professionals validated 27 out of 28 identified credit 
enhancement factors, and five factor groupings were made through factor analysis. Afterwards, network theory is applied to find 
the unanswered questions, which by graphical and mathematical representations show that the host government’s credit 
enhancement, MDBs, ECAs and other parties’ credit enhancement are prominent and of great importance to handle the 
associated risks of IPP projects in Asia. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
In Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects, identifying appropriate credit enhancement factors is considered 
critical for the successful financing of a project. Though credit enhancement means a third party’s assurance for 
payment, performance or obligations to major participants in a project on off-take, supply and completion 
agreement, but there are various ways to enhance the credit of a project [1]. Credit enhancement helps broader risk 
mitigation to stakeholders of a PPP project, as it provides political risk coverage and also mitigates cost-overrun risk. 
Moreover, credit enhancement improves project's creditworthiness so a project becomes bankable at reasonable 
interest rates.  
Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects in Asia face some challenges like demand risk, payment risk, price 
risk, currency parity risk and foreign exchange availability risk. To overcome these issues, the major stakeholders 
(i.e. the host government, sponsors, Multi-Development Banks and Export Credit Agencies) of the projects provide 
some credit enhancement schemes that not only mitigate those risks but also earn better ratings for that project, thus 
making the project more credible though the project falls in non-investment grade. While some related studies [2-6] 
have been documented in this area, some questions left unanswered yet. Examples are: What are the major credit 
enhancement factors for financing IPP projects in Asia? Why are they powerful? What are the minor credit 
enhancement factors? Why they are less influential? What are the obstacles that cause them to be less powerful? And 
what are the roles of these credit enhancement factors in addressing risks of IPP projects? This research is thus 
focused on trying to find the answers to these questions. 
2. Research Method 
The research method followed for this study includes two sections. Section 1 consists: (1) a literature review and 
case investigation to identify initial lists of credit enhancement for IPP projects (i.e. content), (2) structure interviews 
to PPP experts to validate the credit enhancement factors identified in step (1) (i.e. content validation), (3) a 
questionnaire survey to IPP professionals in Asia to evaluate the importance of those factors, and (4) factor analysis 
for grouping of factors. Section 2 consists application of network theory using the output of section 1 with the results 
of risk factors.  
2.1. Content 
28 credit enhancement factors were preliminarily identified from literature reviews (journals and books) as 
mentioned by many researchers in their scholarly works. Subordinated loan from financial intermediaries (i.e. from 
IBRD, IDA, IFC, ADB, sovereign wealth funds etc.) acts as a form of credit enhancement in any project [2]. Credit 
enhancement factors can be a letter of credit from the host government, establishing an escrow agreement between 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) and off-taker to capture revenues from off-taker customer to support off-taker’s 
payment obligation, and financing with political risk insurance from multi-lateral agencies or export credit agencies 
or insurance companies [7]. Among other factors escrow accounts, revolving bank guarantees and/or state 
guarantees for off-taker’s payment obligation [6]; contingent equity and the standby letter of credit [8-9]; credit 
support agreements such as central bank’s guarantee as third party, and political risk guarantees by Export Credit 
Agencies [4] are widely used credit enhancement mechanism for PPP projects. It is also found that bank letter of 
credit facility also worked as credit enhancement tool in Colombian power project Termobarranquilla [10].  
Moreover, the authors have investigated credit enhancement factors on twelve power generation projects in India, 
Pakistan, China, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Philippines. They are the Dabhol IPP project in India, the 
AES Lal Pir, Pat Gen and HubCo IPP projects in Pakistan, the Laibin B, Shajiao B, Meizhou Wan projects in China, 
the Meghnaghat and Haripur power projects in Bangladesh, the PT Paiton Energy (Paiton 1) power project in 
Indonesia, the BLCP Power project in Thailand, and the Casecnan Water and Energy project in Philippines. Table 1 
shows those IPP projects and the description of various credit enhancement factors present in those projects. 
135 Abu Naser Chowdhury et al. /  Procedia Engineering  125 ( 2015 )  133 – 142 
2.2. Content Validation 
After identifying credit enhancement factors, the selected experts (all senior lawyers, consultants and academics 
with rich experience in PPP) were interviewed to validate these factors for financing IPP projects in Asia. 27 out of 
28 factors were validated by them. This is done through structured interviews. Interview has a number of unique 
advantages and disadvantages [11]. If well conducted, it can produce in-depth data which are likely to be obtained 
with a questionnaire. 9 interviewees were thus selected from Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
India and Bangladesh who were involved in IPP projects for more than 20 years. The validated factors are the 
factors which five out of nine experts (majority) agreed to consider essential for IPP projects in Asia. Table 2 shows 
the result of the validation of credit enhancement factors by the experts. 
Table 1. Project Description 
Sl. No. Name of the Project Project Description and Some Distinct Credit Enhancement Features 
1 Dabhol Power 
Project, India 
 
BOT, Largest foreign investment in India, Initiated in 1995, Phase 1 financing consists US$920 Million, First 
Indian government guarantee of a foreign corporation’s (ENRON) liabilities, Concession period 20 yrs, Letter 
of Credit, Central Guarantee (monthly basis), Establishment of escrow account, Political risk covered by 
OPIC. 
2 AES Lal Pir, 
Pakistan 
BOO, Initiated in 1994, US$344 Million of which equity from AES and IFC and loans from commercial 
banks and IFC, ECA MITI had provided export proceed insurance that guarantees loan’s principal and interest 
against Pakistan government’s failure to perform its obligations, Concession period 30 yrs, Government of 
Pakistan guaranteed the payment obligations of PSO and WAPDA and foreign currency debt service. 
3 Pat Gen, Pakistan BOO, US$348 Million, 365 MW oil fired power station, Concession period 30 yrs, 10% equity from IFC, 
Pakistan State Oil (PSO) was the fuel supplier and WAPDA is the off-taker, Government of Pakistan 
guaranteed the payment obligations of PSO and WAPDA and availability of foreign currency debt service. 
4 HubCo Power 
Project, Pakistan 
BOO, 4x323MW, US$1.7 Billion, Concession period 30 yrs, World Bank and JEXIM guaranteed loan, 
commercial banks’ partial guarantee on debt service coverage on default. 
5 Laibin B Power 
Project, China 
BOT, Concession period 18 yrs, 2×350MW, US$650 Million, Coal Fired, First BOT project to be formally 
approved at the State Planning Commission, French ECA COFACE took project risk, strong support from the 
central government, counterparty credit risk was mitigated by the Guangxi government also fuel supply and 
power purchase guarantee. 
6 Shajio B Power 
Project, China 
First BOT project in China and indeed in Asia, Initiated in 1984, 2×350MW coal fired plant, US$512 Million 
with a combination of subordinated loan, credible contractor Hopewell, strong Chinese government support. 
7 Meijhou Wan 
Power Project, 
China 
BOT, 2×362MW pulverized coal fired plant, US$725 Million, initiated in 1998, Concession period 20 yrs 
Financing of the project came from a combination of ADB, commercial banks 2 ECAs, foreign exchange 
mechanism provided comfort to foreign lenders. 
8 Meghnaghat Power 
Project, Bangladesh 
BOO, 450MW combined cycle gas fired plant, US$ 295 Million of which US$75 Million from AES, US$ 50 
Million from ADB, US$60 Million subordinated debt by IDCOL and PRG by ADB, Concession period 22 
yrs, Project Initiated in 2000. 
9 Haripur Power 
Project, Bangladesh 
BOO, 360 MW combined cycle gas fired plant, US$183 Million of which US$ 68 Million from AES and 
US$115 Million from IFC and commercial loan guaranteed by PRG, Concession period 22 yrs. 
10 PT Paiton Energy 
Project, Indonesia 
First IPP project in Indonesia, BOO, Concession period 30 yrs,1230MW coal fired project, Initiated in 1994, 
Political risk covered by JEXIM and USEXIM and it extended the debt coverage. 
11 BLCP Power 
Project, Thailand 
BOO, 2×717MW coal fired power project, Concession period 25 yrs, Initiated in 2003, Financed by ADB, 
JBIC, local and commercial bank of US$1340 Million, NEXI provided insurance. 
12 Casenan Energy and 
Power Project, 
Philippines 
US$356 Million, 150 MW, Initiated in 1994, Strong commitment from CalEnergy to finish the project in 4 yrs 
as the company also involved in geothermal project in Philippines which worth US$1 Billion. Project got 
letter of credit from Korea First Bank. 
2.3. Questionnaire Survey 
Finally, 27 credit enhancement factors were included in a questionnaire survey instrument that addressed wider 
issues involved in IPP projects in Asia. The factor ‘an unconditional financial payment obligation by the host 
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government’ was not validated by the experts which reflects that most of the experts considered this factor might 
cause extra pressure to the host government and it would better be compensated by the participation of multilateral 
agencies such as Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) based on the insured outstanding principal and 
any accrued and unpaid interest. The survey was done from October 2013 to March 2014 among PPP professionals 
who have experiences and were particularly involved in IPP projects in Asia. Respondents were asked to rate the 
importance/criticality of each factor on a five-point Likert rating scale ranging from 1 (least important) to 5 (most 
important). 
Table 2. List of credit enhancement factors validated by experts 
Factors related to Credit Enhancement  
No. of Experts Results  
Having influence  No influence   
1. Contingent equity support by the sponsors 9 0 validated 
2. Standby letter of credit by the sponsors  9 0 validated 
3. Shareholder’s retention agreement  6 3 validated 
4. Ability to exit to sales of shares from SPV 5 4 validated 
5. Shareholder’s agreement that SPV reserves maintenance account  7 2 validated 
6. Claw back guarantee by the project sponsors and passive equity investors 6 3 validated 
7. Letter of credit by the host government  7 2 validated 
8. Establishment of government funded debt service reserve account if off-taker is unable to 
make necessary payment obligation  
5 4 validated 
9. Presence of government grants 5 4 validated 
10. Presence of government equity 6 3 validated 
11. Presence of subordinated debt by government  7 2 validated 
12. Involvement of MDBs 9 0 validated 
13. Involvement of ECAs 9 0 validated 
14. Involvement of security trustee  8 1 validated 
15. Involvement of insurance companies  9 0 validated 
16. Presence of subordinated debt from MDBs 8 1 validated 
17. Financing with political risk insurance from MDBs, ECAs or insurance companies  9 0 validated 
18. Establishment of specialized intermediary with equity participation from government, 
domestic financial institutions  
7 2 validated 
19. Unconditional financial payment obligation/guarantee by the host government  0 9 Not validated 
20. Creation of DSRF 6 3 validated 
21. Indexation formula that adjusts the local currency tariffs from inflation and changes in 
tax 
8 1 validated 
22. A trust that grant SPV a priority interest in portion of off-taker’s cash collection in case 
of off-taker’s default  
5 4 validated 
23. Establish an escrow agreement between SPV and off-taker to capture revenues  6 3 validated 
24. Establish a lender managed escrow account for deposit revenues  8 1 validated 
25. Commercial papers from banks 7 2 validated 
26. Standby letter of credit backing contractor’s performance to fulfill its obligation  9 0 validated 
27. Senior lender’s acceptance of back-ended payment profile (i.e. flexible repayment 
schedule) 
6 3 validated 
28. A subordination agreement among government, SPV and lenders for short term cash 
flow pressure  
5 4 validated 
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The respondents were from various different organizations in countries from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 
Thailand, Taiwan, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Vietnam. This can generalize the output 
from the questionnaire survey as different respondents from different countries or regions may have opposite view 
towards the same question. In all, 51 out of 120 distributed questionnaires were completed and returned. 
3. Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses undertaken for this research are descriptive analysis, reliability test using Cronbach’s alpha, 
and factor analysis. Adequacy of sample size for factor analysis could be checked using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) [12] and the value for this test is 0.712. On the other side, Cronbach alpha is 0.856. Here, both the tests 
(KMO and Cronbach’s alpha) suggest that the data collected for the factor analysis were reliable and appropriate 
[13]. Factor analysis helps to identify a relatively small number of factor groupings that can be used to represent 
relationships among sets of many inter-related variables [13-14]. The analysis shows that these factors can be 
grouped into five principal factors (as shown in Table 3) and be interpreted as follows: 
x Factor Grouping 1 - represents shareholders’ credit enhancement: which consists of five factors where higher 
loadings are associated with contingent equity surrport and standby credit support from the sponsors. 
x Factor Grouping 2 - represents host government’s credit enhancement: which consists of four factors and all of 
them have higher factor loadings. 
x Factor Grouping 3 - represents MDBs, ECAs, and other parties’ credit enhancement: which consists of six factors 
where financing with political risk insurance from MDBs or ECAs possess significantly higher loading (i.e. 
0.798) among the group. 
x Factor Grouping 4 - represents capital structure mechanism: which consists of five factors and debt service 
reserve fund possess higher loading among them. 
x Factor Grouping 5 represents commercial banks’ credit enhancement: which consists of four factors in a group 
and higher loadings are associated with standby letter of credit and lender’s acceptance of backended payment 
profile as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Rotated factor matrix (loading) of credit enhancement factors for IPP projects in Asia 
Factor Components Component 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
1. Contingent Equity support by the sponsors  0.8490     
2. Standby credit guarantee by the sponsors 0.8450     
3. Shareholder’s retention agreement 0.6630     
4. Ability to Exit through sales of shares from SPV      
5. Shareholders’ agreement that SPV reserves a maintenance account for O&M before 
making any distribution to shareholders 0.6250     
6. Claw back guarantee by the project sponsors and passive equity investors 0.5473     
7. Letter of Credit by the host government  0.8160    
8. Establishment of government funded debt reserve account if state-owned off-taker is 
unable to make necessary payments to the lenders  0.8030    
9. Presence of host government grants      
10. Presence of Subordinated Debt by Host Government  0.7980    
11. Presence of Equity from Government/ Government Agency  0.7930    
12.Financing with political risk insurance from Multi-lateral agencies or Export Credit 
agencies or insurance companies   0.798   
13. Establishment of specialized intermediary (such as Infrastructure Development 
Finance Company etc) with equity participation from government, domestic financial 
institutions.   0.677   
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Factor Components Component 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
14. Involvement of Multilateral Agencies   0.663   
15. Involvement of Export Credit Agencies    0.648   
16. Involvement of security trustee   0.622   
17. Involvement of insurance companies (Business interruption and casualty insurance 
policies in place)      
18. Presence of Subordinated Debt (by Multilateral Agency)   0.573   
19. Creation of Debt Service Reserve Fund    0.719  
20. A trust that grants SPV a priority interest in portion of  off-taker’s cash collection in 
case the off-taker defaults in payment obligation      0.646  
21. Indexation formula that adjusts the local currency tariffs for inflation and changes 
in tax    0.613  
22. Establish an escrow agreement between SPV and off-taker to capture revenues from 
off-take customer to support off-taker’s payment obligation    0.556  
23. Establish a lender managed escrow account for deposit revenues       0.508   
24. Standby letter of credit backing Contractor’s performance to fulfill its obligation     0.775 
25. Senior lender’s acceptance of back-ended payment profile (i.e. flexible repayment 
schedule)     0.764 
26. Commercial Paper from Banks      0.672 
27. A subordination agreement among government, SPV and lenders for short term 
cash flow pressure     0.634 
Percentage of Variance 28.9% 18.3% 8.2% 5.9% 5.4% 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
          Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
          Rotation converged in 7iterations. 
Application of network theory provides thorough analysis on PPP structure and the relationships among 
stakeholders from a set of agreements/contracts [15]. In this view, the authors have tried to analyze credit 
enhancement factors and their associated risks of IPP projects by network theory to get clear understanding on - 
What credit enhancement factors are the most influential to minimize the associated risks of IPP projects? Why are 
they powerful? What are their roles? What credit enhancement factors are less powerful and what are the obstacles 
that cause them less powerful? Now consider a bipartite (two-mode) graph, which represents credit enhancement 
factors (i.e. five factor groupings from Factor Analysis) and risk factors (where the risk factorsh were clustered into 
10 groupings) [16]. A network is set based on relationships, contains a set of objects (nodes) and a mapping or 
description of relations between objects or nodes [17]. 
Fig. 1 shows the bipartite graph of an IPP project. In this graph, the nodes are divided into two sets so that no 
edge connects two nodes in the same set. Group 1 is the credit enhancement factors and Group 2 is the related risk 
factors of IPP projects. An edge exists only when there is a relationship between risk factors and credit enhancement 
factors but there is no edge between two credit enhancement factors in the same set. Now, this graph can be 
analysed algebraically by introducing adjacency and incidence matrices. 
 
 
h The risk factors were generated from extensive literature reviews and were clustered into 10 groups namely: Political, construction, legal, 
economic, operation, market, project finance, project selection, relationship and natural factors [16]. 
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Fig. 1. Bipartite graph of credit enhancement factors with their associated risks 
In the matrix notation, 
Bij = 1, if node i from the first group links to the node j of second group; 
     = 0, otherwise. 
Therefore: 
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In this matrix, each row represents the credit enhancement factor grouping of Group 1 and the columns represent 
the underlying risks associated with that credit enhancement factor. For example, row 1 represents factor grouping-1 
(i.e. Shareholders’ credit enhancement) and its risks in IPP project. Similarly, row 2 represents factor grouping-2 
(i.e. Host government’s credit enhancement) and its risks in IPP project. Thus, adjacency matrix B is a binary matrix. 
It is neither square nor symmetric in general. 
i and k are linked if both of them are linked to j (as shown in Fig. 2). A ik = Σj B ij Bji; thus collapsing a two-mode 
network into a one-mode network. A = BBT; transposition of a matrix swaps Bxy and Byx, if B is a m-by-n matrix BT 
is n-by-m matrix. 
Therefore: 
Shareholders’ CE 
Host Government’s CE 
…….. 
……… 
 
Commercial Bank’s CE 
Group 1 A    B      C      D     E …… 
Group 2 
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The general formula for matrix multiplication is Zij = Σk X ik Y kj. 
Therefore: 
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The diagonal entities of A give the number of risk factor groupings in which each credit enhancement factor 
grouping is involved. For example, credit enhancement factor grouping-2 (i.e. Host government’s credit 
enhancement) is involved in seven risk factor groupings; similarly shareholders’ credit enhancement is involved in 
three risk factor groupings. Off-diagonal elements of A give the number of risk factor groupings in which both credit 
enhancement factors are involved. For example, there are three risk factor groupings between host government’s 
credit enhancement and capital structure mechanism. Similarly, there is no risk factor grouping between 
shareholder’s credit enhancement and capital structure mechanism and also with commercial bank’s credit 
enhancement.  
Software for social network analysis (computer package UCINET 6.0) is used to draw the network diagram of 
credit enhancement factors for IPP projects. The package incorporates models for detecting core–periphery 
structures in network data [18]. The components of matrix A are now being inserted into the data spreadsheets 
matrix of UCINET 6.0 and then the network diagram is visualized with NetDraw. Fig. 2 shows the network diagram 
generated by NetDraw (UCINET 6.0). The drawing by NetDraw helps to better understand how a particular credit 
enhancement factor is embedded in its neighbourhood and in the larger graph. It gives a sense of the structural 
constraints and opportunities that a credit enhancement factor faces and also makes it possible to understand the role 
that a credit enhancement factor plays in an IPP structure. 
In order to explain the location of each credit enhancement in terms of how close they are to the centre of action 
in an IPP structure, it is necessary to analyse degree centrality, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality 
indices. Table 4 shows graph centralization index of all credit enhancement factors involved in the structuring of IPP 
project agreements. 
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Fig. 2. Structure of Credit Enhancement Factors in IPP Projects by NetDraw 
Table 4. Centralization Index 
Credit enhancement factors grouping ID Degree Betweenness Closeness 
Shareholders’ credit enhancement 1 2 0 66.7 
Host government’s credit enhancement 2 8 2 100 
MDBs, ECAs and other parties credit enhancement  3 7 2 100 
Capital structure mechanism 4 7 0 80 
Commercial bank’s credit enhancement 5 6 0 80 
A credit enhancement factor is said to be most important if it has the most ties. The factor is also being considered 
important if it is relatively close to other factors. In addition to that, the credit enhancement factor that lies on the 
communication paths can control the flow of communication, and is thus important. 
4. Findings and Conclusion 
From the analysis of indices (as shown in Table 3) and network diagram (as shown in Fig. 2), it is found that host 
government’s credit enhancement (i.e. ID #2) and MDBs, ECAs and other parties’ credit enhancement (i.e. ID #3) 
are the influential one in the IPP project structure. All the other credit enhancement factors are surrounded by them. 
Host government’s credit enhancement has the highest degree, closeness and betweenness centralization indices and 
deals with numerous risk factors grouping agreements in the structure. It implies that host government’s credit 
enhancement is a cohesive core actor in the IPP structure. This actor is more influential, has greater access to 
information and can communicate with others more effectively. The second most influential one is – MDBs, ECAs 
and other parties’ credit enhancement factor. The third most powerful credit enhancement factor is capital structure 
mechanism. On the other hand, shareholder’s credit enhancement (i.e. ID #1) and commercial bank’s credit 
enhancement (i.e. ID #5) are the peripheral one in the IPP structure. However, the most peripheral one is 
shareholder’s credit enhancement (i.e. ID #1) as its degree and closeness centrality is the lowest among all others.  
Therefore, the policy makers and other stakeholders of IPP projects should shift their focus from shareholder's 
credit enhancement and pay more attention towards host government's credit enhancement, and MDBs, ECAs and 
other parties' credit enhancement as the analysis shows that these two factor groupings are of great importance to 
handle most of the risks of an IPP project. Presence of these two factor groupings in IPP project not only ensure 
creditworthiness but also better financing of the project in Asia. 
 
3
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Enhancement  
Host Government’s 
Enhancement  
MDBs, ECAs and Other parties' 
Credit Enhancement  
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